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courts, generally limit requests for evidence to material that has al-
ready been exhibited. If a court decision is required-in most in-
stances various forms of accommodation make it unnecessary-the 
court will balance the uniqueness and need for the evidence against 
a presumption that the media need to preserve their news-gathering 
role. 
In other areas Japanese law reflects features of their culture 
that differ from ours. Thus Japan, probably uniquely among demo-
cratic societies, forbids political canvassing. This is partly because 
of a tradition of repression of popular mobilization, but it is also due 
to the fact that a visit by strangers to a house has quite different 
connotations-sometimes of threat, sometimes of obligation-in 
that society. Similarly, the serious Japanese attitude toward affilia-
tions and the obligations they entail makes associational democracy 
complex and different; even assassination of those attempting to 
leave a party remains a familiar event in recent history. 
What is striking is the extent to which there has emerged in 
Japan a societal impulse toward liberty, building upon historic 
foundations such as media efforts to be free and independent even 
under the repression that once prevailed. Trickier, but already 
partly successful, has been the taming and legitimization of older 
traditions of resistance-violent demonstrations and strikes-into 
more limited forms of approved behavior. The process by which so 
much has occurred in four decades has been complex. We are most 
fortunate to have so sensitive and careful a chronicler and analyst as 
Professor Beer. His admirable book will be valued for a long time. 
It may also help to strengthen the trends it so trenchantly describes. 
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: 
CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT. By Wallace D. Loh.1 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1984. Pp. xxix, 778. 
$37.50. 
Robert L. Nelson 2 
This book is an impressive contribution to the study of consti-
tutional change. It can be recommended both as a source book for 
scholars of constitutional history and as a text for courses in law 
I. Professor of Law, Adjunct Appointment with the Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Washington. 
2. Project Director, American Bar Foundation; Research Sociologist, Northwestern 
University School of Law. 
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and social science. The book is impressive not so much for the in-
sights the author provides into the process of constitutional adjudi-
cation or the role that social science has played in the process, as for 
the scope of the materials collected. Chapter by chapter it docu-
ments the increasing tendency of the courts to refer to empirical 
research in deciding constitutional issues. In many significant areas 
of constitutional change over the last thirty years, including school 
desegregation, the death penalty, illegal searches and seizures, and 
various aspects of the selection and functioning of juries, the courts 
have consulted, if not relied on, the findings of social research. 
Professor Lob's principal purpose in assembling these materi-
als was to develop a textbook for students interested in the role of 
social research in the judicial process - mostly graduate students 
in the social sciences. Nevertheless, I think it will be of more inter-
est to constitutional scholars, and not too unfair to Professor Loh, 
to evaluate his text as a source of questions about the role of social 
research in constitutional adjudication. What accounts for the in-
creasing use of social science in constitutional cases? How has it 
been used by the courts and what has been its impact? What will be 
the rule of social research in future constitutional decisions? How 
adequately has Professor Loh addressed these issues through his 
choice of cases and readings and the comments that accompany 
them? 
I 
In the introduction Loh explains that his book is mostly about 
the role that social research has played in the law. Accordingly, 
policy studies are more prominent than general theory. Yet he 
takes care to describe the historical context of the opinions and re-
search findings. This not only establishes continuity in the text, but 
also provides the reader with a sense of the big picture that Loh 
seems to eschew in the introduction. 
The book is organized in four parts. Part I is introductory and 
gives a general overview of the judicial process. While useful to 
students without legal training, much of this material can be skip-
ped by more sophisticated readers. The guts of the work come in 
parts II and III, which deal respectively with social research in the 
appellate process and the trial process. Part IV is a historical, con-
ceptual, and jurisprudential afterword on the preceding sections. 
The substantive portion of the text begins with two compre-
hensive and interesting chapters on school desegregation. Here, as 
in the other substantive chapters, Loh describes the historical con-
text: the enactment of the civil war amendments, the rise of Jim 
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Crow legislation, and the restrained posture taken by the federal 
courts in the early segregation cases. Reprinting substantial por-
tions of the P/essy opinion, he suggests the impact on P/essy of 
Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism and other theories of innate 
racial differences. The text then documents how the accepted view 
of racial differences began to shift as research by Boas, Klineberg, 
and Myrdal assaulted the biological theories. The NAACP began 
to use social research in its efforts to overturn Plessy. The chapter 
includes the celebrated appendix to appellants' brief in Brown, 
which summarized the opinions of social scientists on the effects of 
segregated schooling on blacks and whites, as well as excerpts from 
the trial testimony of expert witnesses in the South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, and Kansas cases. The full text of the Brown opinion is fol-
lowed by Edmond Cahn's attack on the famous footnote 11, in 
which Cahn criticizes the opinion for appearing to rest on the 
"flimsy foundation" of the social science evidence presented. Psy-
chologist Kenneth Clark, who coordinated the efforts of social 
scientists for the NAACP and whose doll studies were cited by the 
Court, responds. Clark argues that the social science evidence was 
relevant to the question before the Court and that Cahn's criticism 
reflects a lawyer's bias that courts should make decisions in isola-
tion from other bodies of intellectual and scientific knowledge. The 
chapter concludes by stepping back from the Brown case in a sec-
tion on the Brandeis brief and its role in Muller v. Oregon. 
In true casebook form, the cases and readings are followed by 
detailed notes and questions that add supplementary information 
and draw out the analysis of the cases. Interspersed among the 
readings are brief statements on elements of constitutional interpre-
tation, such as the differences in the standards of review courts ap-
ply in judging the constitutionality of legislation. This commentary 
was written with care, but its primary value will be to nonlawyers. 
As Professor Loh himself recognizes, there is the danger that the 
novice will come away from these summaries with an excessively 
simplistic sense of the law. 
Chapter four examines the cases and research since the first 
Brown opinion, including Brown II, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg, and Milliken, as well as the findings of the original 
Coleman report, Coleman's reversal on desegregation based on his 
studies of white flight, and conflicting studies concerning the effect 
of desegregation on academic achievement, self-concept, and race 
relations. Loh summarizes the different perspectives on the rights 
and remedies identified in Brown and later cases as "input," "out-
put," and "throughput" perspectives. The input perspective treats 
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Brown as identifying the right not to be subject to intentional dis-
crimination. The output perspective interprets Brown as guarantee-
ing equal outcomes in the quality of education received by different 
groups, without regard to intentional discrimination. The 
throughput perspective treats the case as mandating remedial edu-
cational programs for disadvantaged groups, but according to Loh 
this perspective is unclear about the nature of the violations (if any) 
that trigger the provision of remedial programs. 
Lob's typology, the readings selected, and the comments that 
accompany the text may confuse those who do not understand the 
constitutional analysis of the post-Brown cases. The materials im-
ply that judicial orders to desegregate systems are in some sense 
contingent on finding that desegregation has tangible positive effects 
on minorities. While evidence about the impact of desegregation on 
educational quality and race relations may well influence the Jus-
tices, and even though the remedy in Milliken II requires expendi-
tures by the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan to 
improve educational quality, the gravamen of a constitutional viola-
tion remains the finding of purposeful discrimination by the author-
ities of a particular jurisdiction. The most vexing issue in recent 
post-Brown cases has been whether racial imbalances in schools are 
traceable to governmental discrimination or merely reflect the fa-
miliar pattern of racially segregated housing. 
The chapter on the aftermath of Brown concludes with materi-
als on discrimination against minorities by school administrators 
and employers. Social science evidence played an important role in 
cases alleging that the use of I.Q. tests to assign students to remedial 
classes had invidious effects on the educational opportunities of mi-
norities. But the outcomes of the cases have varied. The chapter 
reprints Judge Peckham's opinion finding a constitutional violation 
in the use of the tests in California; similar evidence was not persua-
sive to a federal district court examining the practices of the Chi-
cago Board of Education. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Griggs and Albemarle, has 
generated similar issues concerning the validity and impact of test-
ing procedures in the context of employment discrimination. A 
striking aspect of litigation involving expert testimony concerning 
discrimination, which is suggested in Judge Peckham's analysis, is 
the enormous discretion that trial judges exercise when interpreting 
conflicting data. The results of such cases typically hinge on quite 
arbitrary and unpredictable standards for drawing (or refusing to 
draw) inferences from the data. 
In chapter five Loh takes up the death penalty cases. He re-
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prints the most significant constitutional decisions, from Wither-
spoon to Furman to Gregg and its progeny, as well as the empirical 
studies about the issues in the cases. With few exceptions (for ex-
ample, the Hovey case, in which the California Supreme Court re-
vised voir dire procedures in capital cases), the decisions have not 
rested on empirical research. Wolfgang's dramatic findings on the 
discriminatory application of the death penalty to black convicts in 
selected counties in Arkansas were not persuasive in an appeal by a 
black convicted in a different Arkansas county. According to the 
court of appeals, the study was not probative because it had not 
analyzed the particular county and the particular jury involved in 
the case. Similarly, when confronting the question of the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment in Gregg, the Supreme Court found the 
statistical studies "inconclusive." 
Chapter six differs from the previous chapters in that it empha-
sizes almost exclusively the impact of court decisions on society 
rather than the impact of social research on decisions. The chapter 
deals with the rulings on the interrogation of suspects and searches 
and seizures. The Miranda opinion, reprinted here, rests on a skep-
tical conception of police interrogation, but does not rely on empiri-
cal evidence to validate that conception. It was only after Miranda 
that Skolnick and others began to examine empirically the Court's 
assumptions, as well as the likely impact of the procedural rules 
that the Justices laid down. Similarly, Mapp started an enduring 
debate over the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule. Despite 
a substantial body of research, studies of the rule have produced 
conflicting and unpersuasive claims.3 Drawing heavily on 
Skolnick's Justice Without Trial, 4 the chapter examines how the or-
ganization of the police affects the implementation of rules designed 
to control police behavior. 
The focal point of the four chapters in part Ill is the jury. 
Chapter seven analyzes the selection of juries, covering jury dis-
crimination cases, the techniques of scientific jury selection, and the 
impact of pretrial publicity on juror partiality. Chapter eight 
presents the cases and research dealing with jury size-the issue on 
which social science has had its most direct effect on constitutional 
decisions. Following the decision in Williams v. Florida, in which 
the Supreme Court approved six-person juries in criminal cases, 
there was an outpouring of research on the effect of jury size. When 
3. See generally Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" 
Arrests, 1983 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 611-90. 
4. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY (1966). 
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a five-person jury was challenged eight years later in Ballew v. Geor-
gia, the Court reversed itself, citing the jury research. Chapter nine 
contains studies of the effect of different evidence rules on jury deci-
sionmaking, including the order in which parties present evidence, 
modes of presenting evidence, and the use of probability estimates 
at trial. Chapter ten deals with eyewitness identification. 
Lob reserved the broadest set of readings for the last part of 
the book, on the theory that students could better deal with such 
generalities after exposure to specific case materials. After a chap-
ter summarizing the history of psycholegal research, and the recur-
rent tensions between lawyers and social scientists, Lob reviews 
major jurisprudential theories about the judicial process: formalist, 
realist, and purposive reasoning. The chapter contains some classic 
essays from Fuller, Holmes, and Llewellyn, woven together with a 
description of the historical forces leading to the rise of different 
schools of American jurisprudence, from the scientific analysis of 
cases initiated by Langdell, to Pound and later the realists, to the 
emergence after World War II of the reasoned elaboration school, 
followed by Dworkin's natural rights model. The final chapter ad-
dresses when and how social research should be used in the judicial 
process. It replays a debate over whether the courts should rely on 
social science in reaching decisions, as well as Harry Kalven's essay 
on searching for the "middle ground" in social research on the law, 
that is, for empirical research that has a realistic possibility of af-
fecting significant legal issues. After considering some of the obsta-
cles to interdisciplinary efforts between lawyers and social scientists, 
Lob concludes on a realistic but upbeat note. Social science can 
seldom solve legal problems, and certainly cannot displace the act 
of judging. Such hopes necessarily invite disillusionment with the 
effort. But social research can inform judicial decisions and make 
them more responsible. 
II 
What then does Lob's book tell us about why social research 
has become decidedly more prominent in constitutional adjudica-
tion? The first place to look is at the courts themselves. The ex-
panding use of social science is tied in part to changes in the 
questions addressed by courts, the nature of federalism, and modes 
of judicial analysis. First, it is only relatively recently that appellate 
courts have defined constitutional issues in a way that regularly 
makes complicated questions of fact and policy relevant to the out-
come. The Supreme Court's reference in Muller to Brandeis's brief 
was a poignant moment in this historical progression. For in 
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Muller, the first systematic attempt to use social research in the 
Supreme Court, Brandeis sought only to persuade the Justices that 
the maximum hours law had a reasonable police power rationale. 
He did not claim that the law was necessarily wise-although of 
course that was the implication of his evidence-only that it was 
sufficiently reasonable to pass constitutional muster. Today, many 
feminists would view Muller in a different light; they would call the 
law, limited as it was to women, unjust sex discrimination.s They 
would dismiss Brandeis's brief as a reflection of paternalistic ideol-
ogy rather than objective science. 
Brandeis and his allies sought to encourage judicial restraint. 
In contrast, the more recent and dramatic expansion of the role of 
social research came in the post-Brown era, as the Supreme Court 
expanded the meaning of due process and equal protection, and 
thus asserted its position as a national policymaking body. It was 
only after the decision that de jure segregation was unconstitutional 
that the courts had to confront questions about the causes of de 
facto segregation in housing and schools. It was only through the 
progressive incorporation of the Bill of Rights that questions about 
the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule, discrimination in the 
selection of juries, and the coerciveness of custodial interrogation 
were presented to federal courts. 
Shifting theories of federalism contributed significantly to the 
rise of social science in the judicial process by expanding the role of 
the federal judiciary. I suppose that federal courts are generally far 
more likely to entertain social scientific expertise than are state 
courts. First, federal judges are on the average more sophisticated 
than state judges, and consequently more receptive to academic ex-
pertise. Besides, the state judiciary is more intimately connected 
with local politics and the local judiciary. It is more likely to rely 
on its intuitions about local conditions and trial judges than on so-
cial science evidence. 
Finally, changes in the structure of federalism accompanied 
the rise of a purposive jurisprudence in which courts began to en-
gage more openly in policy analysis in the course of reaching consti-
tutional decisions. As the courts moved away from more 
traditional legal modes of analysis, factual premises became critical 
to the legitimacy of decisions. (A judge relying on precedent or an 
authoritative text can be oracular; but one relying on "sound pol-
icy" needs evidence.) Social science became one means by which 
the courts could rationalize their decisions on seemingly objective, 
politically neutral grounds. It will be interesting to observe whether 
5. See generally Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMM. 281 (1984). 
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this pattern changes in the opinions of the politically conservative 
appointees of the Reagan administration. If the federal judiciary 
returns to formalist reasoning, social research may become less im-
portant. The new judges may, however, change the substance of the 
law without changing the style of decisionmaking. 
The changing importance of social research cannot be ex-
plained solely by reference to the courts. Without the growth of the 
social sciences since World War II, and the increasing methodologi-
cal sophistication of social research, the social sciences would have 
had little to offer the courts. Moreover, there has been a steady 
expansion of socio-legal scholarship. Interdisciplinary associations 
have thrived since the late 1960's. An increasing number of social 
scientists have built research programs around the policy questions 
articulated by the courts. The cases on the constitutionally permis-
sible size of juries, Williams and Ballew, are an excellent example of 
how a specific empirical question of constitutional import can gen-
erate a substantial body of social research within a short time. 
Do these trends signal the emergence of a powerful role for 
social scientists in constitutional adjudication? I think not. Even in 
cases that rest on relatively narrow questions amenable to social re-
search, the courts have often been unable to interpret social science 
evidence correctly or unwilling to change traditional procedures in 
light of the empirical findings. In the cases on jury size to which I 
alluded above, for example, the Supreme Court's analysis was rid-
dled with technical errors.6 Moreover, even though much of the 
research cited in Ballew attacked six-person juries, the Court re-
fused to reconsider its earlier opinion on the propriety of such ju-
ries. Another glaring example that Loh documents concerns 
eyewitness testimony. Despite a long history of psycholegal re-
search raising questions about the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony, the police and courts continue to rely heavily on such 
evidence. The moral seems to be that when social science conflicts 
with the longstanding traditions of the law, judges resist change. 
In controversial fields experts usually divide along ideological 
lines. Loh's materials are replete with examples of such splits 
among groups of social scientists. It is no wonder that Kenneth 
Clark, the leader of the social scientists in the Brown case, felt a 
sense of betrayal when social scientists began to question the bene-
fits of school desegregation. Shortly after Brown Clark had claimed 
that "proof [of the wrongfulness of segregation] had to come from 
the social psychologists." Twenty years later he found social scien-
6. Kave, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and 
the Size of the Jury, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1004 (1980). 
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tists to be "no more dependable in the quest for social justice than 
other citizens .... [and] primarily responsive to majority fashion, 
prejudices, and power." What had happened, of course, was that 
the issue of de jure Southern segregation had been replaced by the 
issue of "school busing," a much more controversial question in the 
academy. 
Judges often are left to pick and choose among conflicting 
opinions to justify their decisions, or, as the Supreme Court did in 
the exclusionary rule and capital punishment cases, to ignore the 
social scientific findings as hopelessly inconclusive. The level of dis-
sensus in the scholarly community is no doubt disconcerting to law-
yers and social scientists alike. It means that there is no objective 
science of society to which the courts can tum. Social research can-
not rescue the courts from the dilemma of how to make political 
judgments in a principled fashion. 
CHOOSING ELITES: SELECTING THE "BEST AND 
THE BRIGHTEST" AT TOP UNIVERSITIES AND 
ELSEWHERE. By Robert Klitgaard.' New York: Basic 
Books. 1985. Pp. 267. $19.95. 
Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. 2 
In his Bakke opinion, Justice Lewis Powell presented the ad-
mission process at Harvard College as a model worthy of 
emulation: 
The experience of other university admission programs, which take race into ac-
count in achieving the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, dem-
onstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not 
a necessary means toward that end. An illuminating example is found in the 
Harvard College program. 3 
A consensus as to the merits of the Harvard model was, how-
ever, not achieved by the Justices. Justice Harry Blackmun argued, 
"I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, that the 
difference between the Davis program and the one employed by 
Harvard is very profound or constitutionally significant. The line 
between the two is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective 
application is at work."4 
I. Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University. 
2. Professor of Psychology, University of Minnesota. 
3. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,316 (1978). 
4. /d. at 406. 
